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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, MORALITY IN
WAR, AND THE STRUCTURE OF RIGHTS
Edward C. O'Dowdt
Robert F. Schopptt
Abstract: A careful analysis of certain issues of morality in war demonstrates
important differences in the duties recognized by Western and Chinese milital)' officers
toward their soldiers. These differences reflect fundamentally different theories of social
morality in the societies these officers represent. Although Western countries and China
have endorsed a common set of internationally recognized human rights, a meaningful
consensus regarding human rights must remain consistent across three levels of
analysis. The putative contemporal)' consensus among Chinese and liberal societies
fails becanse the fundamental differences in underlying principles of social morality that
give rise to divergent principles of morality in war also generate conceptions of rights
that diverge at the third level. The distinction between conceptual and contingent rights
e"lllicates this divergence.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Many countries, including WesteI1l: liberal democracies and the
People's Republic of China, have endorsed various international political
documents recognizing certain human rights. I The apparent consensus
represented by these widely accepted documents suggests that many
countries and cultures share a set of individual political rights that provide
t Colonel, United States Army.

tt Assistant Professor of Law and Psychology, University ofNebraska.
An earlier draft of this paper was presented at a faculty colloquium attended by members of the
faculties of law and philosophy at the University of Nebraska. We are grateful to Wendy Frieman, Robert
McGeorge, Kidder Smith, and especially to Nelson Potter for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1 By "human rights" we mean rights that are attributed to all human beings simply by virtue of their
being human. JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 85-88 (1973); JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 1-6 (1987). China has ratified the foIlowing hmnan rights conventions: Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination; Convention Relating to the Status of RefugeeS;
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. Ma Jun, Human Rights: China's Perspective,
BEIJING REVIEW, Nov. 28 - Dec. 4, 1988, at 21,22. For an account ofthe current state of human rights in
China from the perspective of the Chinese government see INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA (1991). China has also ratified a series of conventions and treaties addressing
the law of war. JEROME A. CoHEN & HUNGDAH CHlU, PEoPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
DOCUMENTARY STUDY 1415-16 (1974).
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common ground for international discourse. In this paper, we examine two
issues involving morality in war and freedom of expression regarding which
Chinese practices depart markedly from those of liberal societies. 2 We argue
that these examples reveal deeper differences regarding the respective
conceptions of rights and the underlying principles of social morality. These
discrepancies render illusory the apparent consensus regarding human rights.
The focal example involves the ethical standards for military officers as
one aspect of morality in war. Ethical codes for Western military officers
require that officers observe a duty of truthfulness toward their soldiers. This
duty reflects both a general value for honesty and a specific responsibility to
treat the soldiers with respect.3 Traditional Chinese standards for officers'
conduct recognize no comparable duty of truthfulness, emphasizing the
officers' primary responsibility toward the state which requires that they do
whatever is necessary to protect the state by winning the war. 4 This contrast
regarding acceptable officer conduct reveals a corresponding contrast in the
principles of social morality supporting that conduct. 5
We contend that this specific issue of morality in war reve~s a second
and much broader difference regarding the nature and value of rights. These
discrepant positions regarding officers' duty of truthfulness to their soldiers
reflect different conceptions of rights and different attitudes toward the
soldiers as citizens with rights. The Western view emphasizes the soldi~rs'
claim to respect as autonomous individuals who command a substantial
domain of self-determination. In contrast, the Chinese system grants no
significant weight to this concern.6
2 We adopt the following terminology for the sake of brevity. We use "western" and "liberal"
interchangeably to refer to political systems in the western liberal tradition as described at notes 39-42
infra. We make no attempt to defend any specific formulation of liberalism or the general tradition. Our
purpose here is to articulate certain contrasts between these political systems and the mainland Chinese
system regarding the strncture and significance of rights rather than to endorse either approach.
"Chinese" is used broadly to denote the cultural traditions that have evolved from the time of Sun Tsu,
through the Han, and culminating in the modern People's Republic of China. This usage of the term is
not intended to imply the exclusion of the Taiwanese from those traditions, but rather to emphasize that
aspect of Chinese thought that continues to be heavily influenced by, and is best illustrated by, Sun Tzu.
Given the influence of the West and its democratic liberal traditions in the development of Taiwan, the
issues addressed in this article are less relevant in Taiwan. Moreover, we do not claim that this tradition
(derived of Sun Tsu's thought) is exhaustive of Chinese thinking on the subject, even within the
parameters of our usage of the term "Chinese." We contend only that this tradition has been and
continues to be a powerful influence on mainland Chinese military thought.
3 See infra notes 10-14 and accompanying tex1.
4 See infra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 27-32 and accompanying tex1.
6 See infra notes 39-51 and accompanying tex1.
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Individual rights constitute a core element of Western liberal
democracy. Liberal political thought defines a relationship between the
individual and the state, requiring that the state respect certain basic liberties
of the individual, and particularly that it treat individuals as beings capable of
directing their own lives within broad limits. This respect requires
recognition of basic political rights. 7
Chinese political institutjons
purportedly recognize human rights and endorse the basic international
political declarations referred to previously.8 In addition, some scholars have
argued that the Chinese social structure accommodates the same values
protected by Western rights although perhaps through different legal
mechanisms. 9 Can one reconcile these claims with the different views held
by Western and Chinese societies of acceptable officer conduct toward
soldiers in war and with the Chinese government's willingness to override or
revoke individual rights in order to promote social goals?
In this article, we examine carefully the specific contrast between the
Western and Chinese positions regarding officers' duty of truthfulness toward
their soldiers. This contrast reflects broad, fundamental differences between
the two systems regarding their substantive political philosophies and the
conceptions of rights that prevail within those political structures. These
underlying differences illuminate a broader set of issues regarding the
meaning and significance of rights in Western and Chinese societies. A brief
discussion of the second example involving freedom of expression reveals the
significance ofthese differences in that arena.
Although we discuss morality in war at some length and freedom of
expression briefly, we do not attempt to provide exhaustive or definitive
analyses of these issues. The central argument of this paper advances
conceptual claims about the nature of rights and the importance of
interpreting those rights in the context of the broad social morality within
which they are embedded. Societies accepting different substantive theories
of social morality might reach apparent consensus regarding human rights by
endorsing facially similar rights. This consensus remains merely apparent,
however, if these societies differ regarding the underlying social morality
within which they ground those rights. In these circumstances, societies may
7 A. Buchanan, Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 99 ETHICS 852, 853-54
(1989).
8 See supra note 1.
9 See, e.g., JAMES C. HsIUNO, Human Rights in East Asian Perspectives, in HUMAN RJOHTS IN EAST
AsIA: A CuLTURAL PERSPECTIVE 1,9-11 (James C. Hsiung ed., 1985).
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differ regarding what it means to have a right in that society and in the
normative force vested in various rights. The discussion of morality in war
and freedom of expression demonstrates the practical significance of these
conceptual claims in two disparate but important arenas of political
interaction.
We contend that the apparent international consensus regarding human
rights is illusory and that an adequate cross-cultural analysis of rights requires
a complex conception of rights including their foundations in the substantive
social morality in which they are embedded. In order to understand the
relationship between liberal and Chinese rights, one must distinguish
conceptual and contingent rights. Although this paper directly addresses only
rights in the Western liberal tradition and their counterparts in the Chinese
system, a similar analysis applies more broadly to the comparison of rights
embedded in disparate substantive moralities.
The argument proceeds in the following manner. Section II defines
more precisely the officers' duty of truthfulness toward their soldiers, with
particular attention to the apparent foundations of the officers' conduct in the
relevant duties and rights. Section III examines this issue and the discrepant
conceptions of rights that it reveals. In this section, we contend that a
satisfactory explication of rights must address three levels of analysis.
Finally, section IV summarizes and concludes the argument.

II.

LYING AND MORALITY IN WAR

A.

The Western Standard

The responsibility (or lack thereof) of military officers to be truthful
with their own soldiers during war represents one aspect of a more
comprehensive professional ethic for military officers. This code of ethics
constitutes, in turn, a major component of that society's approach to morality
in war.I 0 The Western officer's duty of truthfulness arises from a more
general commitment to the virtue of honesty; the good officer does not lie,
10 Moral questions about war can be rougWy divided into two categories. Questions about the
morality afwar are directed toward the moral justifications for fighting wars. The study of morality in
war examines the moral quality of particular types of conduct people engage in during a war. The
chivalric codes and later laws of war, for example, limited the actions that a combatant could legitimately
engage in against various classes of persons. M. WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 21, 34-35 (1977).
This paper ,viII address morality in war. See generally J.T. JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE
REsTRAINT OF WAR (1981).
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cheat, or steal. 11 Honorable officers do not accept mere expediency as a
sufficient justification for lying to their soldiers because they endorse honesty
as one of the principles that guide officers' conduct during warfare. 12
This duty also reflects respect for the rights of the individual soldier.
Soldiers are viewed as citizens who hold certain rights against the state and
whom the state must treat with respect. Although military service necessarily
limits selected liberties, soldiers retain their status as citizens who retain as
many of their rights as possible. 13 Thus, the Western standard arises from a
theory of correct moral principles for an honorable officer and from the right
of the individual soldier to be treated with respect as a citizen.
Although the abstract standard categorically condemns officers' lying to
their soldiers, one can imagine hypothetical circumstances in which most
readers would probably agree that officers have a moral duty to deceive their
soldiers because only by doing so can they prevent catastrophic results.
These examples do not reduce the principle to a mere rule of thumb, however,
because a merely incremental benefit is not sufficient to override the
In addition, when faced with
principled importance of honesty.
circumstances in which the expected consequences of truth-telling are so
adverse as to justify deception, the officer who endorses the Western
standard should lie reluctantly, regretting the lie as a necessary sacrifice of an

11 L.P. CROCKER, THE OFFICERS' GUIDE 36 (45th cd. 1990).
12 U.s. DEPT OF DEFENSE, THE ARMED FORCES OFFICER DoD GEN-36, at 46-47, 79 #14 (1988)
(emphasizing the officer's duty of honesty toward the troops). Western honor codes prescribe standards of
acceptable conduct for officers and soldiers during warfare. For a discussion of a professional military
ethic for American military officers emphasizing a conception of honor including integrity, honesty, and
candor, see AE. HARTLE, MORAL ISSUES IN MIUTARY DECISION MAKING 46-54 (1989). Officers' codes
are intended to serve both as moral constraints on conduct and as guides to achieving long-term
resolutions to armed conflict. See generally DEPT OF THE ARMy, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, FIELD
MANuAL 27-10 (1956, reprinted 1990). This manual serves as the basis for training and discourse
regarding the law of land warfare in the U.S. military. Sidney Axinn discusses the intended relationship
between moral constraints and effective long-term resolutions to conflict in A MORAL MILITARY (1989).
13 DEPT OF THE ARMy, FuNDAMENTALS IN MILITARY LAW, ROTC MANuAL 145-85, at 14-19 (1980).
Since the French Revolution, armies have increased in size, drawing upon "citizen-soldiers" as well as
professional military officers. The obligation of officers to treat their soldiers with respect arose from the
understanding that these citizen-soldiers fought in wars in order to defend the state which protected their
rights. Effective warfare required that these soldiers sacrifice certain liberties, but they retained others,
especially the rights to participate in the political compact they were protecting and to be treated with
dignity as a person with a stake in the society for which they were fighting. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at
172-90. For further discussion of American officers' duty toward their troops as arising from broader
principles of American political morality and the standing of the troops as American citizens, see HARTLE,
supra note 12, at 36-54.
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important moral principle. That is, deception, even when justified by
overriding consequentialist considerations, is viewed as a necessary evil. 14

B.

The Chinese Approach

Although it is extremely difficult to assess current views in the People's
Republic of China on morality because so little information is available about
the internal workings of the Chinese People's Liberation Anny, the broad
outline of Chinese thought on correct officer conduct is available in the
classic works of the Chinese military tradition. Sun Tzu provides the
foundation of this tradition. Sun Tzu's The Art of War was probably written
between the fifth and third centuries B.C.E. Throughout Chinese history it
has remained so important to the study of military thought that statesmen,
soldiers, and philosophers have written commentaries on its applications, and
the dynasties used it as the basis for the military examination system until the
beginning of the twentieth century.15 Mao Tse-tung quoted and paraphrased
sections of The Art of War, and The People's Liberation Anny continues to
conduct conferences and publish volumes on Sun Tzu's thought. 16 The moral
14 M.S. Klimov, Lying to the Troops: American Leaders and the Defense of Bataan, 20
PARAMETERS: THE U.S. ARMy WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY 48 (1990). Klimov examines an historical
episode in which superiors lied to their subordinates, condemning the deception as unjustified by a
stringent standard of "military necessity." He clearly understands lying to one's troops as rarely justified
and as highly regrettable in those rare cases. H.L.A. Hart describes a similar pattern of reluctant and
regrettable sacrifice of moral principle when e:dreme circumstances require puuishment of the innocent.
H.L.A. HART, PuNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY 11-13 (1968).
An informal survey of a nonrepresentative sample of American military officers revealed that
these officers report that they would avoid lying to their troops if at all possible. When presented with
e:\1reme hypotheticals of the type referred to here, they consistently reported that they found passive
deception less objectionable than active misrepresentation, suggesting that they vest substantial weight in
the letter of the code.
15 SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR (Samuel B. Griffith trans., 1963). The Chinese continue to publish
new editions of the work and commentaries on it. See. e.g., WU RUSONG, SUNZI BfNG FA QIAN SHOU [An
E:\'Planation of Sun Tzu's Art of War] (1987).
16 Security practices by the People's Liberation Army render it very difficult to establish official or
unofficial policies of that organization through unclassified sources. Our contention that the moral view
represented by Sun Tzu retains a central role in Chinese military policy finds support in the following
sources. The Military Science Publishing Society in Beijing has recently published SUNZI JIAOSHI [The
Comparative E:\'Planations of Sunzi] (Wu Jiulong ed. 1990). A bibliography in a volume published by the
Liberation Army Publishing Company, the official publisher of the Chinese People's Liberation Army,
lists 19 books and 148 articles addressing Sun Tzu that were published from 1980 to 1988. See SUNZI XIN
TAN [New E:\'Plorations of Sun Tzu] 399-418 (1990). The discussion contained in section II.B. of this
Article is based on materials presented at an international conference in Beijing and to be published in
volume II of SUNZI XTN TAN. Sun Tzu's classic work has also been widely translated into Japanese,
Korean, and Vietnamese.
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view expressed in this classic work represents mainstream Chinese thinking
about morality in war and about the relationships between leaders and those
they lead.J7
In contrast to the Western standard, Sun Tzu advocates deception in
any circumstances in which it is expedient. The general is the protector of the
state; as such, the general's only purpose is to protect the people and to
promote the interests of the sovereign.18 In war, victory is the object, and
warfare is based on deception. 19 Deceptive strategy often involves
maneuvering to confuse and surprise the enemy, but the general should also
lie to his superior (the emperor), his officers, and his soldiers whenever doing
so will promote his mission of winning the war. 20 The general should
manipulate his own army lias if driving a flock of sheep."21 Deception and
manipulation of one's own forces is not limited to concealing plans. The
general should also conceal from his own troops the danger they face. 22
Furthermore, the officer should treat his soldiers as children, making
use of rewards and punishments in order to control them and render them
useful.23 Sun Tzu discusses reward and punishment purely in terms of
rendering the troops effective resources, with no apparent direct concern for
fairness, desert, or respect for the soldiers. The general should sacrifice
expendable agents in order to convey false information to the enemy24 and he
should place his troops in hopeless situations in order to motivate them to
fight with desperate intensity.25
Finally, one author of this Article (Colonel O'Dowd) has participated in an extended series of
conversations and negotiations with Chinese militaIy officers during his 24 year militaIy career. This
series includes his current assignment as senior militaI)' officer authorized to negotiate with Chinese and
North Korean officers for the United Nations Command in the Republic ofKorea.
17 For these reasons, the term "Chinese morality" will be used in this paper to isolate the moral
views e"'llressed by sun Tzu that are representative of systematic Chinese thinking on issues of social
morality, particularly in warfare. As indicated in note 2supra, we do not contend that Sun Tzu presents a
comprehensive view ofChinese thought regarding militaIy and social ethics.
18 SUN TZU, supra note 15, at 3-18, 10-9 (all references to SUN Tzu cite to chapter and paragraph).
191d. at 1-17,2-3,7-12.
201d. at 8, 10-18 (deceiving the sovereign); 11-13,49 (concealing the truth from the officers and
soldiers). See also ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMy IN ACTION: THE KOREAN
WAIl.. AND ITS AITERMATH 164-65, 179-85 (1967). George reports a modern example in which Chinese
officers engaged in awidespread pattern oflying to their troops about the dangers they faced.
21 SUN Tzu supra note 17, at 11-49.
221d. at 10-20, 21.
23 !d. at II-55.
241d. at 10-20, 21 (treat as children and discipline), 9-47 (punish to render them effective).
251d. at 13-19.
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It is important to notice that in contrast to the Western view, lying to
serve the desired end is not presented as a regrettable but necessary evil to be
tolerated in exceptional circumstances. Rather, lying and deception are
endorsed as fully acceptable techniques to be freely employed under ordinary
circumstances. Sun Tzu adopts a purely consequentialist stance toward
deception and manipulation according to which victory constitutes the only
relevant criterion of acceptable conduct, and thus, the moral quality of any
particular lie depends solely upon the propensity of that lie to promote
victory.26 There is no evidence to suggest that any nonconsequentialist
factor, including considerations of moral principle, carry any weight in the
decision.
Perhaps the most stark contrast between Sun Tzu and the Western
approach lies in the officers' treatment of their own troops. Western and
Chinese generals are primarily concerned with winning wars, and this task
requires that they view troops as resources, some of whom must be expended
in order to accomplish the task. The striking contrast, however, lies in the
apparent lack of any moderating attitude toward one's own forces in Sun Tzu.
While Western officers view their troops as resources, they also recognize an
obligation to treat their soldiers with as much respect as the primary
responsibility of winning the war will allow. In short, well-established
principles of military responsibility require that Western officers view their
soldiers as persons who must be employed as resources in the warP
One finds no evidence in Sun Tzu to indicate that the general ought to
think of his troops as persons as well as resources. There is no evidence of
any duty on the part of officers to treat the soldiers with consideration or
respect. Discussion of the general's conduct toward the troops is cast purely
in terms of behavior that will maximize their value as resources in battle.
When Sun Tzu addresses the importance of the relationship between the
commander and his soldiers, he relies on an instrumental rationale rather than
on a moral one. The commander should treat his soldiers humanely to the
26 As we use the terms in this paper, purely cousequentialist theories identifY the right action as that
which will produce good outcomes, where good outcomes are those which maximize production of the
value endorsed by the theory as the fundamental good. Deontological theories deny this direct
relationship between the good and the right, contending that the right action is determined at least
partially by generally formulated duties and rules that carry positive moral weight independent of the
consequences. WILLlA.1.l K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 14-16 (2d ed. 1973) (Frankena uses the term "teleological"
for the theories we identifY as "cousequentialist.")
27 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying tel\1. See also U.S. DEP'TOFDEFENSE, supra note 13, at
54 (discussing officers' duty to protect their troops from injustice).
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extent that this type of relationship enables him to use them' effectively to
carry out his plans, but Sun Tzu provides no evidence to support the notion
that the commander might have any nonderivative moral duty running to the
troopS.28
Although Western and People's Republic of China (pRC) officers must
view their troops as resources, some of whom must be expended in order to
win the war, they emphasize different modes of leadership, reflecting
different underlying values. These differences include divergent views of the
individual. Western theories of social morality endorse individual autonomy
as an important value and recognize rights as the political institution designed
to protect this value. This theory of social morality produces a preference for
persuasive, rather than manipulative, modes of leadership. The Chinese
system, in contrast, vests primary value in promoting social harmony and
lacks an independent value for individual autonomy.29 This value structure
supports either persuasive or manipulative modes of leadership according to
the circumstances in which either is more effective in promoting the central
value. In short, the choice between persuasive and manipulative styles of
leadership is merely an instrumental decision for one who endorses the value
structure embodied in the Chinese system, but the liberal social morality
provides an additional noninstrumental reason for preferring the persuasive
mode.
The purely consequentialist Chinese approach is particularly interesting
because Chinese approaches to social morality are traditionally interpreted as
duty-based systems in which individuals are not expected to act on a
consequentialist calculus, but rather, they are required to conform' to a set of
socially accepted roles in various relationships. Those roles are defined in
terms of the duties of each individual in the relationship.30 Consequentialist
moral theories are often contrasted with deontological ones which are often
understood as duty-based. 31 It would be consistent with a deontological
approach, for example, to contend that people have general duties to tell the
truth and to conform to the rules of proper conduct in relationships and that
these general duties carry normative weight independently of the
consequences. Mixed theories incorporate consequentialist and deontological
28 SUN TZU, supra note 15, at 9-48. "Thus, command them with civility and imbue them uniformly
with martial ardour and it may be said that victory is certain."
29 See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
30 T'UNG-Tsu CH'U, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA 267-80 (1961).
31 See supra note 26.
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components, holding that under certain circumstances the weight of
consequences can override the deontological considerations, resulting in
cases in which it is morally right to violate the deontological duty in order to
promote the morally superior consequences. Even in these cases, however,
the duties would not cease to carry moral weight independently of the
consequences. Rather, the continued moral relevance would be overridden
by important consequentialist considerations that justifY sacrificing these
deontological principles in these cases.32
The general Chinese approach to social morality at least appears to
take the form of a duty-based deontological system in which individuals are
expected to conform to the duties defined by the various social relationships
in which they participate. 33 Yet Sun Tzu advocates a purely consequentialist
approach to decision-making for the military officer. Neither the general
social morality nor Sun Tzu's prescription for the military officer appears to
be amenable to interpretation as a mixed theory. This seems to place Sun Tzu
and the military officer in direct conflict with Chinese social morality.
Three possible interpretations of this puzzling state of affairs present
themselves. First, the apparent conflict is an actual one; the position
advanced in Sun Tzu is inconsistent with the general principles of Chinese
social morality. Second, the purely consequentialist nature of Sun Tzu is only
apparent. Third, the deontological nature of Chinese social morality is only
apparent. Accepting the first interpretation leaves one with the task of
explaining and justifYing an approach to morality in war that differs
fundamentally from the broader social morality in which it is embedded. The
second and third interpretations avoid this perplexing inconsistency, providing
avenues for integrating the military ethic into the larger social morality. At
least at first glance, the second alternative appears to be a more promising
strategy for those who argue that the Chinese system corresponds
substantially to Western rights-based societies. We conclude, however, that
the third interpretation most accurately portrays the Chinese system of social
morality and, furthermore, that this alternative renders consistent the military
and social moralities of China, but it does not accommodate attempts to
reconcile this integrated system with liberal ones.

32 HART, supra note 14, at 1I-l3. Hart discusses a situation in which an actor ought to sacrifice an
important moral principle for a greater good without concluding that the sacrificed principle ceases to
carry weight.
33 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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Rights and Duties

Some scholars have argued that the Chinese duty-based approach
protects interests that are roughly equivalent to those protected by Western
rights.3 4 On this interpretation, the Chinese and Western social moralities
endorse the same values, or at least highly similar ones, through different
legal mechanisms. This thesis initially appears to be consistent with the
traditional Hohfeldian conception of legal rights which defines rights in a
manner that renders them reciprocal with duties. On this theory, to say that a
person X has a right to do act A is to say that all other persons Y, against
whom X holds this right, have a duty to refrain from interfering with X's
doing A. Thus, to say that X has a right to vote, or to speak freely is to say
that all those against whom X holds this right have a duty not to interfere with
X's voting or speaking freely.3 5
When X holds a political right against the government, the correlative
of that right may be better understood as a disability or lack of authority on
the part of the government rather than as a duty. Insofar as X holds a
constitutional right to freedom of speech or religious exercise, for example,
the correlative limitation on the government is the government's lack of
authority to pass laws that limit speech or the exercise of religion. The
central Hohfeldian idea remains, however, that X's right against Y to do A
entails reciprocal normative limitations regarding Y's conduct with respect to
X's performing A. 36
On this conception of legal rights, rights and duties are reciprocal in
that they define a relationship between X and Y that can be stated either in
terms of X's right to do A or in terms of Y's correlative duty to refrain from
interfering in X's doing A. This conceptual structure suggests that one might
be able to demonstrate that a Western rights-based political system and a
Chinese duty-based system share similar fundamental values and establish
similar basic protections for human beings through complimentary political
structures, each of which could in principle be translated into the other.
This strategy builds upon the duty-based understanding of the Chinese
system, raising perplexing questions about the consequentialist approach of
Sun Tzu. First, can one integrate Sun Tzu's consequentialist position with the
34 See, e.g., Hsiung, supra note 9, at 9-11.
35 WALTERN. ROHFELD, FuNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 35-50 (Waller W. Cook ed., 1978).
36 NICKEL, supra note I, at 31-32. When we refer to correlative rights and duties in this paper we
use "duties" in this extended sense, referring to nonnative limitations on Y's conduct.
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general emphasis on duty in Chinese social morality and then interpret this
integrated system as one which protects the same fundamental values that the
Western systems protect through the mechanism of human rights? Second,
does this interpretation sufficiently explain the apparently stark differences
between the two systems regarding the officers' duty of truthfulness toward
their soldiers?

ill.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN WAR. AND POLmCAL PHILOSOPHY

A.

Rights and Duties: Syntax and Semantics

Hohfeld's framework provides an analysis of rights by defining the
structure of the relationship between the parties in terms of rights and
correlative duties. It can be understood as a syntactical analysis in that it
describes the interactional structure of rights and correlative duties between
the parties, but it does not address the content of rights. An actual system of
political rights that conforms to Hohfeld's syntactical structure will also
reflect the content of the substantive political philosophy represented
(however imperfectly) by that system of rights. One can think of this content
as the semantics ofthe system of rights and analyze it at two levels.
The first semantic level of a system of rights consists of the face
content of those rights. While X's right to do A syntactically implies
normative limitations on any Y against whom X holds this right, this first
level of semantic analysis gives content to A. For example, the rights to
engage in free speech or religious worship and the government's correlative
lack of authority to pass laws limiting this type of conduct represent the
semantic content of political rights protected by the first amendment of the
United States Constitution}7
It is possible, however, for two political systems to provide facially
identical rights for different reasons. Rights can serve as legal devices that
advance a variety of agendas and underlying values. The right to free
exercise of religion, for example, might reveal a deeper principle of selfdetermination, holding that each individual ought to be allowed to determine
her own fundamental moral principles. Alternately, however, it might reflect
a primary value for religion itself or the intent to promote social harmony and
the belief that suppression of religious exercise usually generates social
37 u.s. CONST. amend. I.
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unrest. ill short, two systems of political rights may vary semantically at the
level of face content or at the level of the underlying value that provides the
foundation for the right.
A complete explication of rights must attend to all three levels of
analysis. The syntactic and facial semantic levels provide a topographic
description of rights as they are recognized in a particular legal or moral
structure. The foundational level of semantic analysis provides an account of
the substantive political philosophy underlying these rights. Some critics
might contend that this foundational level of semantic analysis is more
appropriately understood as addressing the moral theory that justifies the right
than as a component of the right itself. We argue, however, that two
topographically identical rights that differ at the foundational level also differ
in their normative force and practical impact. For this reason, topographic
descriptions that do not address the foundational level can mask important
differences among apparently similar sets ofrights. 38

B.

Rights in the Western Liberal Tradition

John Stuart Mill articulated a principle of government that many people
accept as the classic statement of the English liberal political thesis. "[T]he
sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. .
.. [T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to

38 Jules Coleman has advanced a theo1Y of legal rights in which he addresses syntactic and semantic
aspects of rights. His theo1Y concentrates on the role ofliability, property, and inalienability rules in the
analysis of rights. As Coleman analyzes rights, these transaction rules form part of the semantic level of
analysis in that they specifY the content of the rights. J. COLEMAN, MARKETs, MORALS, AND THE LAW 2863 (1988). Our analysis is consistent with Coleman's in that at the syntactic level, rights are reciprocal
with duties in the extended sense in which that term means normative limitations on action as discnssed
supra at note 36 and in the accompanying text The facial level of semantic analysis addresses the content
of the right which includes the subject matter and the transaction rule. The rights that concern us in this
paper would be rights defined by property rules in Coleman's terms. In this paper, we do not advance a
complete theo1Y of rights. Although our discussion of rights is consistent with Coleman's, it differs from
his in that it distinguishes the facial and foundational levels of semantic analysis describing the
relationship between the topographic right and the foundation in the deeper theo1Y of social morality. We
are concerned with describing the three levels of analysis and with establishing the distinction between
conceptual and contingent rights. The distinction between these two illuminates the fundamental
differences between the liberal and Chinese conceptions of rights.
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others.
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign. "39
Joel Feinberg's contemporary fonnulation of liberalism emphasizes and
develops the value of individual autonomy. He distinguishes four senses of
"autonomy" and focuses attention on autonomy as a right to
self-detennination or personal sovereignty. When a person possesses
autonomy as a right, he has authority to chose for himself over primarily
self-regarding matters, especially central life decisions involving his person,
privacy, and property. In Feinberg's view, government may not interfere in
voluntary, self-regarding choices by a competent person for that person's own
good because the value of autonomy is morally basic, not derivative. 4o
Ronald Dworkin advances a liberal conception of equality as the core
of liberalism. This liberal conception of equality takes the fonn of an abstract
right to be treated with equal concern and respect. This abstract right
generates the less abstract right to be treated as an equal and independent
person rather than as one who is subservient to others. Finally, at the most
concrete level, liberalism protects legal rights that give specific content to the
political status of the autonomous individua1. 41
Interpreted collectively, Mill, Feinberg, and Dworkin reveal a picture
of liberalism as a political theory that vests a nonderivative value in the
autonomy of the individual. This fundamental value for personal sovereignty
gives rise to individual rights at three levels of abstraction. Legal rights to
specific liberties and to equal treatment regarding societal resources protect a
sphere of self-determination and give effect to the most abstract right to
respect as an autonomous person. Soldiers in a liberal society are citizens
who hold these rights that reflect the fundamental value for individual
autonomy. Soldiers retain the abstract right to be treated with respect and as
many of the concrete rights and liberties as can be maintained given the
special needs of the military function. 42

39 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68-69 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1974).
40 FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 28-62 (1986).
41 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 259-78 (1977).
42 We do not endorse any particular conception of liberalism. We are committed only to the claims
that mainstream liberal thought vests fundamental value in individual autonomy and that this value
requires some substantial sphere of individual self-determination. We do not claim that autonomy must
be the only fundamental value in a liberal society. Others such as human welfare and social harmony or
community may also be important, but individual autonomy is fundamental in the sense that it is not
derived from, or reducible to, any other.
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Rights are a particularly appropriate mechanism for instantiating this
value for individual autonomy because recognizing X's right to do A does
more than just allow X to do A. Establishing and protecting X's right to do A
also identifies X as the primary source of decision making authority over X's
doing A. It vests X with standing to decide whether X will do A, waive the
right to do A, or retain the right while refraining from exercising it. The right
to do A not only allows X to do A, it authorizes X to stand up and demand
that he be allowed to do A as his due rather than to request it as largesse from
the government. 43
The authority to determine whether one will exercise a right may not
constitute part of what it means to have a right because in some
circumstances, X may have both a right to do A and a duty to do A. X may
have, for example, a right to travel guaranteed by the Constitution and a
contractual obligation to travel to a particular place at a particular time such
that he is not free to decide not to travel without incurring a burden under the
contract. A few mandatory political rights do not allow the holder to decide
whether to exercise them. For example, school children are often understood
to have a right to an education, but mandatory attendance laws do not allow
them discretion regarding their exercise of these rights. 44 The point here is
that rights provide a particularly effective mechanism for instantiating a
liberal political philosophy in a legal system because under most
circumstances, rights vest control and decision-making authority in the rights
holder in a manner that renders them highly compatible with the fundamental
value for individual autonomy.
The officer's duty not to lie to or mislead the soldiers is at least
partially grounded in the duty to respect the individual autonomy of the
soldiers who retain their standing as citizens.45 To a substantial degree, then,
the officer's duty of truthfulness is derivative from the soldiers' right to respect
43 JOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY: EsSAYS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY
143-58 (1980). Recall that the rights we are discussing are those which are defined by property rules in
Coleman's tenns, as eXlllained in note 38 supra.
44 ld. at 157-58.
45 DEPT OF THE ARMy, LEADERSHIP AND CoMMAND AT SENIOR LEVELS, FIELD MANuAL 22-999, AT
27 (1986). MilitaIy officers are exhorted to "develop and sustain the ethical climate," emphasizing

loyalty, duty, integrity, and candor. Conduct marked by integrity and candor toward the troops is
mandatory because American soldiers are American citizens whose rights are only subject to the
minimum limitations essential to accomplish the mission of the militaIy. See HARTLE, supra note 12, at
36-54. Hartle discusses the American officers' ethical duties as the product of a broad underlying duty to
uphold the U.S. Constitution and the principles of political morality represented in the Constitution,
including the individual rights and liberties of soldiers as citizens.
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as an autonomous person, and this right is primary in the sense that it directly
represents the fundamental value of the liberal system and provides a
rationale for the officer's duty. The officer's duty of candor promotes the
soldiers' ability to exercise their specific rights and thus, their capacity for
autonomous self-determination, to the degree possible in the circumstances.
C.

Rights in the Chinese Social Morality

The traditional Chinese social morality is usually understood to be
duty-based in that for each person X, X acts rightly when X fulfills all
responsibilities in each social relationship in which X participates. The
Chinese emphasize the importance of these duties through the concept of li
(ritual or propriety) which includes both proper conduct in relationships and
the propensity or disposition to engage in such conduct. Those who have
successfully cultivated li consistently engage in social conduct that fulfills
their responsibilities in all relationships.46 By doing so these individuals
contribute to the social harmony which is the good of the people, where "the
people" is understood in the collective sense.47
The social harmony is the fundamental good toward which all right acts
are directed. Each X fulfills the duties of each social relationship with each Y
because a complete system of social relationships with all social duties
properly fulfilled constitutes the social harmony, which constitutes the good
of the people. That is, the fundamental good in the Chinese social morality is
social harmony; social harmony consists of a complex network of
relationships within which all persons participate by fulfilling the duties
defined by those relationships.
This theory of social morality emphasizes duty in that individuals
ordinarily select the proper act by fulfilling specified duties rather than by
engaging in a consequentialist calculus expected to identify the acts expected
to maximize some state of affairs that is perceived as good independently of
46 WING-TSITCHAN, A SOURCEBooK IN CHINESEPHIWSOPHY 790 (1963).
47 Some critics might contend that the priority of social hannony in Chinese

society has been
illusory. These critics would contend that those in power have defined the relationships required by
"social hannony" in a manner calculated to promote their own interests. It is certainly possible that the
Chinese system, as well as the liberal one, has been manipulated for personal gain. Our concern here,
however, is with the putative compatibility of the principles of political morality represented by the
Chinese and liberal social structures. In order to evaluate this claim in the most favorable light, we will
accept at face value the priority of social hannony in Chinese society, and we will argue that the
compatibility thesis fails in principle.
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the acts themselves. It also resembles Western consequentialism, however, in
that one ought to perform one's duties because doing so promotes a state of
affairs (social harmony) which has been identified as the fundamental good
toward which all should strive. Thus, right acts produce social harmony in
the sense that a complete set of interpersonal relationships in which the
parties fulfill their duties constitutes social harmony. Fulfilling one's duty in
social relationships is not a right-making property of action independently of
the product of such action. Rather, doing one's duty is a right action because
doing so contributes to the social harmony by constituting part of it.
If one understands a consequentialist morality as one which defines
right actions purely as those which maximize the good and a deontological
morality as one which denies that right actions are defined purely by their
tendency to produce the good, then the Chinese social morality is duty-based,
but it is not deontological. 48 It remains similar to Western consequentialism
because the rightness of fulfilling one's duty reflects the role of such conduct
in producing the good of the people rather than any right-making property that
stands independently of social harmony. Thus, the direct consequentialist
relationship between production of the good and rightness of action obtains.
The Chinese social morality differs from more familiar Western
consequentialist theories in that duties are defined into the state of affairs that
constitutes the good and serves as the sole criterion of rightness for actions.
Under ordinary circumstances, therefore, most people will be able to promote
that state of affairs only by fulfilling their duties in social relationships. It
remains possible, however, that in unusual circumstances a particular
individual may be able to promote the social harmony through conduct that
does not constitute part of it but will encourage harmonious behavior by
others.
Some readers might argue that the Chinese social morality is
appropriately categorized as a consequentialist theory, while others might
disagree. One's position in this dispute might vary with the precise
formulation of consequentialism adopted. Arguably, some familiar Western
concepts, such as the distinction between consequentialist and deontological
theories, do not transfer smoothly to the Chinese social morality because the
Chinese view does not share the Western emphasis on the role of the
individual as a moral decision maker. We do not pursue these issues here.
The analysis presented here requires only the claim that the Chinese system
48 See supra note 26.
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resembles Western consequentialism in that a direct relationship exists
between production of the good and rightness of action. The Chinese
approach defines the fundamental good as social hannony. The tendency to
promote this good serves as the sole measure of the moral quality of
individual actions and of social institutions.
In this view, the social hannony----rather than Y-forms the primary
focus of X's duty to act properly in the relationship with Y because the social
hannony is the fundamental value underlying the entire set of relationships
and duties. If Y has standing to complain that X has failed to fulfill his duty,
the force of Y's complaint arises from X's failure to promote the social
hannony rather than from X's failure to give Y his due. In short, X's duty to
act in a particular manner in the relationship with Y is not most accurately
understood as a duty to Y. Rather, it is a duty to promote social hannony
through a certain type of conduct directed toward Y.49
The Chinese officer's duty in war, like the private individual's duty in
interpersonal relationships, is directed toward promoting the social hannony.
Officers at war, however, pursue social hannony under extraordinary
circumstances in that they are primarily concerned with using violence to
protect and restore the relationships that constitute social hannony. The
officer's acts are intended to have a direct and dramatic effect on disrupted
relationships, promoting hannonious conduct by the participants. This
anticipated effect justifies the officer's behavior in war. While the officer's
duty in war calls for conduct that differs markedly from that required of
participants in ordinary peaceful relationships, the common thread lies in the
underlying value: social hannony. Social hannony provides the criterion of
rightness both for the officer's conduct in warfare and for individual behavior
that fulfills prescribed duties in peaceful relationships.

D.

An Officer's Duty in War

The Chinese officers' duty regarding their conduct toward their soldiers
is primarily a matter of duty to promote the social hannony, rather than one of
49 For a general discussion of these issues involving Chinese social morality, see P.R Peerenboom,
Confucian Justice: Achieving a Humane Society, 30 INT'LPHIL. Q. 17 (1990); T'UNG-Tsu CH'U, LAW AND
SOCIETY IN TRAomONAL CHINA 226-47 (1961).
Notice that the Chinese approach to social morality bears striking similarities to Joel Feinberg's
"NowheresvilIe" as he describes it in RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY, supra nOle 43, at
143-48.
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obligation to the soldiers. Officers, like others, act rightly when they act in a
manner designed to protect the social harmony, but unlike most others, they
do not do so exclusively within a framework defined by relationships that
jointly constitute the social harmony. Rather, they engage in warfare in order
to restore the prescribed social relationships and chastise those who disrupted
these relationships, and thus, the social harmony. They function, therefore, in
a more conventionally consequentialist manner; they act rightly when they
perform the act calculated to maximize the good, by winning the war and
restoring proper relationships. 50 Lying to one's soldiers, therefore, is correct
if and only if it is the act calculated to win the war, and thus, to best promote
the social harmony. Moreover, if lying is right by this criterion, it is
unqualifiedly right because protecting the social harmony is the only
nonderivative measure of rightness. The officer who lies under these
conditions has violated no moral principle, and thus has no reason to regret
the need to lie.
The officers' duty toward their soldiers in the Western liberal tradition
differs fundamentally from that of the Chinese system. The officers' duty of
truthfulness to their soldiers reflects the liberal value for individual autonomy
in that the duty is partially rooted in the requirement that the officers respect
the autonomy of the soldiers to the extent that the special responsibilities of
the military allow. Officers ought to avoid lying to their soldiers because
those who lie to their soldiers treat them as mere tools to be manipulated. In
contrast, those who are truthful with their soldiers treat them as autonomous
agents with the capacities needed to comprehend their circumstances and
their responsibilities. They are able to conduct themselves as autonomous
agents who act out of an understanding of those responsibilities. 51
The principles underlying these different views regarding the propriety
of lying to one's soldiers extend to other aspects of morality in war. Both
Western and Chinese officers are charged with the primary responsibility of
protecting their respective societies by winning the war. The different
political philosophies represented by these two societies have important
ramifications for the criteria by which officers evaluate the moral
acceptability of various methods for fulfilling that responsibility. The officer
who accepts the Chinese system--with its promotion of social harmony as
50 If several acts will win the war, that which is least disruptive to the social harmony in other ways
is the right act
51 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. See also KuMOV, supra note 14, at 51, 58-60
(discussing lies by superiors to their subordinates as insults to the troops).
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the sole moral measure of all acts--concludes that any act that maximizes
protection of social harmony is unqualifiedly right. Hence, the fact that an act
violates an interest that would be protected in the west by an individual right
has no direct bearing on the rightness of that act, although it may have an
indirect bearing if protecting that interest is thought to be important in
promoting social harmony.
The Western officer, in contrast, operates in a political system in which
the fundamental value for individual autonomy places constraints on the
acceptability of actions, even when performed in pursuit of the primary
responsibility: winning the war. The Western officer who lies to his soldiers
in order to win the war infringes on the soldiers' right to be treated with
respect as autonomous individuals, sacrificing an important principle of
liberal social morality. The officer who decides that circumstances justify
such lies should regret this sacrifice of principle, regarding his lie as a
necessary evil. This pattern of reasoning extends to other actions that
threaten interests protected by individual rights.

E.

Rights and Social Policy

The differences in substantive political philosophy that ground these
contrasting views of morality in war extend to broader issues of public policy
and political relations between the individual and the state. Political rights
provide effective legal mechanisms for instantiating respect for individual
autonomy in the liberal political structure because in most cases, the
right-holder decides whether to exercise that right, to waive it, or to retain it
while refraining from exercising it. While rights may be sacrificed in certain
cases when they conflict with other more important rights or with overriding
interests, they continue to signify the independent value of individual
autonomy, providing a principled constraint on the means through which
social goals may be pursued. 52
The Chinese system vests fundamental value in social harmony rather
than in personal autonomy. This political structure can recognize political
rights, and these rights might closely resemble those of a liberal society in
form and facial content. Insofar as that political structure is consistent with
the underlying social morality, however, those rights are maintained because
they are thought to support the social harmony rather than because they
52 DwoRKIN, supra note 41, at 90-92; NICKEL, supra note 1, at 16-17.
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reflect a nonderivative value for individual autonomy. These rights represent
one strategy for promoting the social goal rather than a principled constraint
on the manner in which it is pursued.
The foundation for these rights lies in the state of affairs they are
expected to promote, allowing them to be violated or retracted without regret
or sacrifice of important moral value if it should appear that retaining and
respecting these rights undermines social harmony. Rights that fail to
promote the social harmony lose their only foundation in moral value, and
hence, they retain no residual normative force. The "four bigs," for example,
were proclaimed as the Chinese people's rights of expression in the 1950s.53
These rights were guaranteed by the Chinese constitution in 1978. By 1979,
however, the political situation had changed, and these rights of dissent were
seen as socially disruptive. They were restrained in 1980, and a new
constitution which did not mention the "four bigs" was ratified in 1982. 54
Recall that the Chinese government has endorsed human rights
conventions, and that scholars have argued that the Chinese social morality
protects interests corresponding to those represented by liberal rights. 55 On
the Hohfeldian syntactical framework, a Chinese duty-based system may well
be comparable to a complementary liberal rights-based system. In addition,
at the facial level of semantic analysis, the Chinese constitution may endorse
a set of political rights similar to those recognized by liberal systems.
Assume that these two conditions obtain. Despite these similarities, liberal
rights differ significantly from Chinese rights due to important contrasts at the
foundational level of semantic analysis.
Rights that share similar topographic properties but differ at the
foundational semantic level do not function as rights with identical content
that are maintained for different reasons. Rather, the foundational differences
can significantly affect the normative force and practical implementation of
the rights. Most if not all political rights are limited in the sense that they
may be justifiably infringed when they conflict with other rights or with
overriding consequentialist considerations. Societies that differ regarding
their underlying principles of political morality will also differ regarding the
53 ANDREW 1. NATHAN, CHINESE DEMOCRACY 36 (1986). The "four bigs" included: big character
posters, great debates, airing one's views, and contending in a big way.
54 ld. A Chinese constitution may not cany a special status as the foundation of the legal system
comparable to that of the United States Constitution. The point here, however, is that rights of expression
were formally recognized but quickly revoked when they were perceived as socially disruptive.
55 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
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factors that they accept as sufficient to limit or override a right. Thus,
societies that diverge at the foundational level of semantic analysis will limit,
infringe, or revoke rights under different circumstances. Two societies with
topographically identical rights may differ regarding the normative force and
practical effect of those rights, therefore, because they attribute limiting force
to different considerations or because they weigh the same factors differently.
Consider, for example, a distinction between conceptual and contingent
rights that addresses the relationship between the foundational level of
semantic analysis and rights as represented by their topographic properties.
Recall that rights provide a particularly appropriate legal mechanism for
instantiating the fundamental value for autonomy because respect for
autonomy requires a sphere of personal sovereignty or self-determination over
central and essentially self-regarding life decisions. Rights usually vest
decision making authority in the rights holder, providing the individual holder
with a legal device for exercising personal sovereignty over that aspect of life
that falls within the scope of the right. 56 A political structure might protect
religion, for example, through a variety of laws. But a political system that
protects religion by granting a right to liberty regarding religious exercise
protects not only religion but also autonomy in religious life. The right vested
in the holder entitles her to exercise discretionary control over her religious
life and to claim her sovereignty in this aspect of her life as her due rather
than as largesse granted by the government.
Rights that reflect a nonderivative value for autonomy are conceptual in
the following sense. Certain topographic properties of rights, including the
syntactic association with normative limitations on the conduct of others, the
focus of control in the holder, and the important ability to assert a claim to the
right as one's due, bear a close conceptual relationship to autonomy. The
concepts of individual discretion, sovereignty, authority, and control are
central both to autonomy and to rights. Political structures that reflect
fundamental value for autonomy can protect both specific interests and
individual autonomy by employing rights as the legal mechanism through
which they promote and protect those interests.
Rights do not bear this conceptual relationship to the social harmony
that constitutes the fundamental value of the Chinese social morality. While
this social system might recognize rights, the foundation for such rights
consists of hypothesized contingent relationships between these rights and
56 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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social harmony which constitutes the sole criterion for evaluating acts, duties,
or social institutions in that society. Thus, these rights are contingent rights in
the sense that their topographic properties are only contingently related to the
fundamental value that supports them at the foundational level. Contingent
rights may in fact provide an effective and appropriate means for promoting
the purposes they serve, but there is no deeper conceptual or normative
connection between the topographic features of the right and the underlying
value. There is no reason, therefore, to respect or retain contingent rights
when evidence suggests that the underlying value could be better served
through other means.
Although rights might promote social harmony, alternative social
institutions might do so at least as effectively. The traditional Chinese social
morality, for example, pursues social harmony by emphasizing the duties of
participants in social relationships.57 It remains an open question whether the
recognition of legal rights would promote social harmony more or less
effectively than would an exclusive focus on duty. In contrast, it is difficult to
understand how one could design a social structure for the purpose of
promoting the liberal value of individual autonomy without including rights or
some functionally similar institution.
The prospect of disastrous consequences might justify limiting
individual expression in a liberal society, for example, but the prospective
harm must be extreme in order to override the intrusion into personal
autonomy involved in restraint of expression. Even in those cases in which
these conditions are met, we would consider it unfortunate that we could
avoid those consequences only by restricting expression. That is, we would
regard the intrusion into individual autonomy as a necessary evil. A social
morality that incorporates freedom of expression as a contingent right rather
than as a conceptual right would address similar circumstances in a different
manner. A society that vests ultimate value in social harmony and grants a
right to free expression only because such a right is expected to promote
social harmony has no reason to retain that right or to regret its sacrifice when
circumstances suggest that violating or revoking it will promote the
underlying value more effectively. Such a society can revoke or violate a
right for a merely marginal gain in social harmony and it can do so without
regret because a right that does not promote that value retains no normative

57 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying te:l.1.
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weight at all. The sequence of events involving the "four bigs" illustrates this
pattern. 58
In short, rights of expression that correspond topographically are not
identical unless they also converge at the foundational level of semantic
analysis. The apparent agreement between Western and Chinese rights in this
area fails because these societies diverge at this level, recognizing conceptual
and contingent rights respectively. Other societies may diverge at the third
level for other reasons regarding different rights. The critical point is that in
order to provide a true consensus that can serve as common ground for
international discourse and mutual criticism, a set of human rights must elicit
consensus at all three levels of analysis.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of Chinese and Western approaches to morality in war
and freedom of expression reveals important differences between the
conceptions of rights adopted by these political systems. These conceptual
and normative differences have important practical ramifications. The
Chinese officers' lack of any duty of truthfulness toward their own troops
reflects the consequentialist nature of their code of morality in war. This
code is consistent with the broader conventional social morality which
resembles Western consequentialism, although in a more subtle manner. The
Chinese conventional social morality defines duties in a manner that is
intended to produce a network of social relationships that constitutes the
social harmony. Conforming to one's duties, therefore, produces social
harmony because each relationship in which duties are fulfilled constitutes
part of the social harmony. Although duties playa central role in this system,
it resembles Western consequentialism in that the duties that determine right
action carry normative force only because fulfilling them produces social
harmony by constituting part of it.
Western officers, in contrast, have a duty of truthfulness toward their
troops. This duty carries normative force independently of any good
consequences it might produce, and it is grounded at least partially in the
soldiers' right to be treated with respect as autonomous individuals. Soldiers
hold this right as citizens in a liberal society that vests nonderivative value in

58 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying tell.1.
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individual autonomy, and they retain it despite certain limitations in its
concrete implementation in the context of a military organization.
At the syntactic level, the duty-based Chinese system may be
susceptible to translation into a lIberal system of rights. In addition, the
duty-based system may be very similar to liberal societies at the facial level of
semantic analysis. The Chinese system provides a series of protections that
correspond roughly to those found in the United States Bill of Rights,
including freedom of thought and expression and protection from
unreasonable search and seizure.59 Finally, the Chinese government has
endorsed several international political conventions intended to protect human
rights consistent with the liberal tradition. 6o
The analogy fails, however, at the foundational level of semantic
analysis. Individual rights in the liberal tradition reflect a nonderivative value
for individual autonomy, while rights in the Chinese system serve an
instrumental purpose insofar as they promote social harmony. Liberal rights
are conceptual rights in the sense that rights provide a legal device that bears
a close conceptual relationship to the underlying value of personal autonomy.
The fundamental value of the Chinese system supports only contingent rights
because the role of rights in promoting social harmony is a ~ontingent one, if
rights promote harmony at all.
The contingent nature of Chinese rights reflects the substantive social
morality within which they occur. Rights retain their value in this system only
insofar as they maximize social harmony. When rights do not do so,
therefore, they can be freely violated or revoked without sacrifice of any
moral principle. Rights that do not promote the social harmony retain no
residual normative force or foundation in moral principle.
In contrast, violating or revoking liberal conceptual rights infringes on
the fundamental value of individual autonomy that forms the foundation of
those rights. When conflicts among rights or extreme circumstances require
infringement of a conceptual right, an important moral principle is sacrificed.
Thus, infringement of conceptual rights, even when justified, involves a
choice of lesser evils that wrongs the rights-holder. Conceptual and
contingent rights are not equivalent, therefore, regardless of their topographic
similarities.

59 See generally INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE CoUNCIL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA (1991).
60 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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If international consensus regarding human rights is expected to
establish a mutually accepted and useful standard of political criticism,
topographic agreement will not suffice. The apparent consensus remains
illusory unless it extends across all three levels of analysis. This requirement
is not merely theoretical. Social structures that converge topographically
while diverging at the foundational level of semantic analysis may share
certain properties, but they can generate divergent conclusions about the
appropriate responses to various states of affairs involving rights and duties.
The analysis presented in this paper demonstrates that the apparent consensus
among liberal and Chinese societies fails at the foundational level because
these societies differ in that they establish conceptual and contingent rights
respectively. This theoretical difference generates important practical
divergence between the systems regarding morality in war and freedom of
expreSSIOn.

